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Abstract 
 
Nations with non-competitive higher education systems and with high levels of 
corruption, are more exposed to phenomena of discrimination and favoritism in faculty 
recruitment. Italy is a case in point, as shown by empirical studies, judicial reports and 
media attention. Governments have intervened repeatedly to reduce the problem, with 
scarce success. The 2010 reforms to the university recruitment system provided that 
access to the ranks of associate and full professor would now be possible only through 
an initial “scientific habilitation ” to be awarded by sectorial committees of national 
experts. The objective of this work is to analyze the relationship of the recent 
habilitation procedure outcomes to the actual scientific merit of the various candidates, 
as well as to other variables that are explicative of possible practices of favoritism and 
discrimination. The analyses identify the presence of potential cases of discrimination 
and favoritism. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the current knowledge-based economy, the quality of human capital is key in 
determining the competitive advantage of economic systems. Universities, as the 
institutions dedicated to the education of human capital, thus assume ever more vital 
importance for global competitiveness and socio-economic development. The 
strengthening of the higher education systems has thus become increasingly central in 
the policy agenda of a growing number of countries. The effectiveness of recruitment 
and advancement of university professors is crucial to the search for excellence. In 
competitive higher education systems (such as in the U.S. and the U.K.) the pursuit of 
competitive advantage leads to the development of world-class universities, whose main 
distinctive competence is their ability to attract, develop and retain highly-talented 
national and foreign faculty. In those systems, appointments to academic positions are 
handled through local ad hoc search committees or advertisements in international 
social network and scientific journals. Differently, in several European countries, 
including Germany, Sweden, Denmark and Italy, where the state has a significant 
presence in the regulation and direct financing of universities, competitive mechanisms 
are often weak, and faculty recruitment and advancement take place by rigid 
procedures, frequently regulated by a central bureaucracy (Auranen and Nieminen, 
2010). Moreover, nations where non-competitive higher education systems are further 
associated with high levels of corruption, are more exposed to phenomena of favoritism 
and discrimination in faculty recruitment and career advancement. Italy is a case in 
point. According to The Global Competitiveness Report 2014-2015 (Schwab, 2014), 
Italy ranks 106th out of 144 countries in deterioration in the functioning of its 
institutions, and 134th in favoritism in decisions of government officials; while placing 
54th out of 150 countries in the 2014 World Democracy Audit for corruption.2 It is no 
surprise then that the Italian concorso, nationally regulated competition for academic 
recruitment, is generally perceived as an unfair selection practice, as shown by 
empirical studies, judicial reports and media attention (Zagaria, 2007; Perotti, 2008). 
Various Italian governments have made countless attempts to overcome the chronic 
social disease of favoritism, by changing the rules and procedures of the academic 
appointment system, however with scarce success. Most recently, hopes were raised in 
many parts of the academic community when an announcement emerged that career-
path competitions would now be based on quantitative indicators. In fact new 
legislation, introduced in 2010, provided that the access to faculty positions would take 
place through competitions announced by each individual university, and open 
exclusively to the participation of candidates holding a so-called national “scientific 
habilitation”. The habilitation process was to involve evaluations of the candidates by 
committees of experts, relevant to the many fields of the applicants’ scientific activity. 
Habilitation is not a new mechanism in the panorama of European university 
recruitment processes. For a number of years, it has also been applied in other forms in 
Germany (Enders, 2001), and more recently in France (Musselin, 2004) and Spain 
(MEC, 2007). A new and unique feature of the Italian habilitation is that it involves the 
use of bibliometric indicators to support the committee evaluations, in this case with the 
data on the indicators provided by the Italian Ministry for Education, University and 
Research (MIUR). In fact in the ministry’s initial scheme, any award of habilitation was 
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to be subsequent to passing the threshold values in all the three bibliometric indicators 
of research performance, thus creating an outright block against mediocre candidates 
arriving in the rank of professor. 
However the publication of the decree spelling out the evaluation criteria and 
parameters, followed by the release of the threshold values, unleashed an increasingly 
heated debate. Those who were favorable recognized the measures as new guarantees of 
greater objectivity and transparency, imposed over the familiar situation. Those who 
were against, stigmatized the use of bibliometric criteria for the evaluation of scientific 
activity, which requires evaluation by peer review. In the end the “opposers” won, in 
spite of the fact that many studies had already demonstrated a high correlation between 
the value of scientific production assessed by bibliometric indicators, and that assessed 
through peer review processes (Wainer and Vieira, 2013; Li et al., 2010; Norris and 
Oppenheim, 2010; Reinhart, 2009; Meho and Sonnenwald, 2000). The Minister himself 
(who had by that time replaced the original sponsor of the changes) had to intervene to 
clarify that the expert committees would be paramount in defining the parameters and 
criteria for evaluating the candidates in their sectors, and that the ministerial decree 
simply set “guidelines”: the candidates’ standing in respect to the median of the 
ministerial indicators was neither a condition (nor any guarantee) of obtaining 
habilitation. This sequence of decisions opened notable breaches in the dyke of 
quantitative criteria that had been introduced to hold back the generalized practices of 
favoritism. As was to be expected, the publication in 2013 of the results of the first 
habilitation again unleased a storm of polemics, supported by troubling analyses, case 
stories and anecdotes. The most startling paradox that emerges from our investigation is 
that of three candidates habilitated by the same committee to full professors, but not to 
associate professors. In his 2015 annual address, the president of the Region of Lazio 
Administrative Court, reported that 1240 proceedings had been launched by the 
candidates of habilitation competitions3. After a second habilitation round, all this led 
the government to interrupt the procedure for the subsequent habilitation competitions, 
to make important corrections. It also led the authors to undertake the study presented in 
this manuscript. 
The first Italian habilitation competition has been so far the object of two other 
studies. Marzolla (2015) computed descriptive statistics providing a picture of the 
outcome of the qualification procedure. He also analysed the correlation between 
outcome and the values of bibliometric indicators. Pautasso (2015) instead explored 
gender issues in both participation and outcomes. The object of the present work is the 
analysis of the relation between the outcomes of the national habilitation, the scientific 
merit of the candidates (measured by the values of the bibliometric indicators), and 
other explicative variables of possible practices of favoritism and discrimination. The 
diagnoses that emerge from these analyses could be of further support to the 
government as it readies its corrective measures for the next habilitation competitions. 
In a longer-term and international view, the aim of the investigation is also to examine 
the potential of bibliometrics not only as a support for the comparative evaluation of 
individual candidates, but also as an instrument for the ex-post assessment of the work 
by evaluation committees. In this sense, bibliometrics could serve not only towards the 
efficient selection of faculty, but also as a deterrent to practices of discrimination and 
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favoritism in selection processes. 
Indeed, problems of fairness in academic appointments are not limited to Italy. The 
international literature has dedicated considerable attention to the study of academic 
recruitment and promotion, largely regarding questions of gender and minority 
discrimination (Zinovyeva and Bagues, 2015; van den Brink et al., 2010; Cora-Bramble, 
2006; Price et al., 2005; Trotman et al., 2002; Stanley et al., 2007). One of the 
conclusions is that discriminatory phenomena seem to develop above all when 
evaluations are based on non-transparent criteria (Rees, 2004; Ziegler, 2001; Husu, 
2000; Ledwith and Manfredi, 2000; Allen, 1988). In effect, academic recruitment is 
often reported as an informal process in which a few powerful professors select new 
ones through cooptation mechanisms (van den Brink et al., 2010; Husu, 2000; 
Fogelberg et al., 1999; Evans, 1995). Such mechanisms often conceal the phenomenon 
of favoritism, which has been intensively examined in only a few nations, such as 
Turkey (Aydogan, 2012), Australia (Martin, 2009), Spain (Zinovyeva and Bagues, 
2015) and Italy (Abramo et al., 2014a; 2014b; Perotti, 2008; Zagaria, 2007). In 
Zinovyeva and Bagues’ (2015) examination of the Spanish university system, the 
investigators concentrated on the role of connections between the candidates and the 
evaluators composing the examining boards deciding on academic promotions. They 
show that the future performance of candidates who were promoted and had a weak 
connection with the evaluators was better than that of their colleagues. Conversely, 
successful candidates with a strong link to the evaluators register worse performance 
both before and after their promotion. 
For Italy, Abramo et al. (2014a) investigated the effectiveness of the selection 
process for academic advancement, referring to the case of 287 associate professor 
competitions launched in 2008. The analysis showed that the new associate professors 
were on average more scientifically productive than their incumbent colleagues. 
However several critical issues appeared, particularly concerning unsuccessful 
candidates who outperformed the competition winners in terms of research productivity, 
as well as a number of competition winners who resulted as totally unproductive. 
Almost half of individual competitions selected candidates who would go on to achieve 
below-median productivity in their field of research over the subsequent triennium. 
In a further work, the same authors attempted to discover the potential factors that 
could have contributed to the outcomes of the 2008 round of Italian competitions 
(Abramo et al., 2014b). They identified that the main determinant of a candidate’s 
success was not their scientific merit, but rather the number of their years of service in 
the same university as the committee president. Where the candidate had actually 
cooperated in joint research work with the president, the probability of success again 
increased significantly. These results confirm what Zinovyeva and Bagues (2015) have 
demonstrated for the Spanish case, i.e. the existence of mechanisms of selection that are 
completely contrary to the intentions of the regulatory framework for the competitions. 
Before presenting our work, it must be acknowledged from the very beginning that 
research performance is not the only dimension of quality of a candidate to academic 
positions. In addition, the bibliometric indicators introduced by the legislator in any case 
represent a proxy of the real value of a researcher’s scientific activity. The bibliometric 
assessment of research performance by quantity and quality of output neglects other 
attributes of the scientists’ activities, for example the ability to manage research teams, 
to attract funds, their activities in consulting, teaching, editorial work, technology 
transfer, and so on. For this, other than the bibliometric criteria, the normative 
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framework for the habilitations indicated a list of further criteria that the committees 
could consider, and left it to the committees themselves to explicitly define the 
evaluation model that they would apply. Still, common sense would lead us to believe 
that there is a strong correlation between research productivity and all other dimensions 
of scientific merit. 
The next section of the paper summarizes the overall characteristics of the Italian 
academic system, while Section 3 provides greater detail on the “scientific habilitation” 
process. Section 4 describes the results of the habilitation competitions by bibliometric 
sector and provides a regression analysis to determine the impact of the possible 
determinants. Section 5 attempts to quantify the cases of apparent discrimination and 
favoritism by sector of competition. Section 6 concludes the work with the authors’ 
discussion and recommendations. 
 
 
2. The Italian higher education system and recruitment of university professors 
 
The MIUR recognizes a total of 96 universities as having the authority to issue 
legally-recognized degrees. Sixty-seven (70%) are public, but employ 95% of the 
overall faculty. Universities are largely financed by government through non-
competitive allocations. It was only following the first national research evaluation 
exercise (VTR) conducted between 2004 and 2006, that a minimal share, less than 4% 
of total income, was assigned by the MIUR on the basis of the assessment of research. 
This share has currently been raised to 18% of total allocations. 
In keeping with the Humboldtian model, there are no “teaching-only” universities in 
Italy, and all professors are required to carry out both research and teaching. National 
legislation includes a provision that each faculty member must provide a minimum of 
350 hours per year of teaching. At the close of 2014, there were 55,672 faculty members 
and a roughly equal number of technical-administrative staff. All new personnel enter 
the university system through public competitions, and career advancement can only 
proceed by further public competitions. Salaries are regulated at the centralized level 
and are calculated according to role (administrative, technical, or professorial), rank 
within role (for example assistant, associate or full professor) and seniority. None of a 
professor’s salary depends on merit. Moreover, as in all Italian public administration, 
dismissal of unproductive employees is unheard of. 
The entire legislative-administrative context creates an environment and culture that 
are barely competitive, yet flourishing with favoritism and other opportunistic behaviors 
that are dysfunctional to the social and economic roles of the higher education system. 
The overall result is a system of universities that are almost completely undifferentiated 
for quality and prestige, with the exception of the three tiny Schools for Advanced 
Studies and a very small number of private, special-focus universities (Abramo et al., 
2012). The system is thus unable to attract significant talented foreign faculty, or even 
students. The numbers are negligible: only 1.8% of research staff are foreign nationals. 
Over the 2004-2008 period, 6,640 (16.8%) of the 39,512 hard-sciences professors did 
not publish any scientific articles in the journals indexed by the Web of Science (WoS). 
Another 3,070 professors (7.8%) did achieve publication, but their work was never cited 
(Abramo et al., 2011). This means that 9,710 individuals (24.6%) had no impact on 
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scientific progress measurable by bibliometric databases.4 An almost equal 23% of 
professors alone produced 77% of the overall Italian scientific advancement. Differently 
from competitive higher education systems, this 23% of “top” faculty is not 
concentrated in a limited number of universities, but is instead dispersed more or less 
uniformly among all Italian universities, along with the unproductive academics, so that 
no single institution reaches the critical mass of excellence necessary to develop as an 
elite university and compete at the international level (Abramo and D’Angelo, 2014). 
The recruitment and career advancement of professors are regulated by specific law, 
overseen by the MIUR. In the attempt to reduce favoritism in recruitment, there have 
been major reforms of the norms over recent years, with the last one being Law 240 of 
2010, which introduced a double level of evaluation for selection of associate and full 
professors. The first level is national, managed directly by the MIUR, and is intended to 
habilitate all candidates who have sufficient scientific qualifications. The second is 
managed by the individual universities, to select the candidates best suited to the 
specific needs of the university from among those first habilitated at the national level. 
Prior to Law 240, the processes of recruitment and career advancement were in the 
hands of the individual universities, following procedures dictated at the central level. 
The transparency provisions, the nomination of a national committee of experts in the 
field, and the timely issue of regulations for the evaluation procedures were all intended 
to ensure effectiveness in the selection process. In reality, the characteristics of Italian 
system - such as the generally strong inclination to favoritism, the structured absence of 
responsibility for poor performance by research units, and the lack of incentive schemes 
for merit - undermined the credibility of selection procedures for hiring and 
advancement of university personnel, just as happens for the Italian public 
administration in general. The intention of the policy makers in introducing the 
habilitation competition prior to the actual recruitment was to reverse past trends and to 
limit or even eliminate the inherent inefficiencies and favoritism. The “scientific 
habilitation”, through the objective evaluation of the candidates’ scientific merit, was to 
guarantee the appropriate pre-selection of those then eligible to apply for competitions 
launched by the individual universities. 
 
 
3. The scientific habilitation process 
 
The regulations governing the national scientific habilitation descend from Law 240 
of 20105. and are detailed by: “Regulation concerning the awarding of national 
scientific habilitation”, contained in Presidential decree 222 of 14/09/2011 and 
“Regulation specifying criteria and parameters for the evaluation of the candidates and 
the assurance of Committee-members qualifications”, in MIUR Ministerial decree 76 of 
07/06/2012. The MIUR also created a new Agency for the Evaluation of University and 
Research Systems (ANVUR), which was assigned responsibility for certain aspects of 
implementing the habilitation. 
According to the regulatory framework, every two years the MIUR must issue a call 
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for appointments to 184 “judging committees”, with one committee for each 
competition sector (CS). The CSs derive from the aggregation of the so-called Scientific 
Disciplinary Sectors (SDSs, 370 in all), which serve in general for the classification and 
administration of all Italian university faculty: under this system, each professor is 
unequivocally classified as practicing in a specific SDS. The SDSs, and so also their 
aggregations in CSs, are grouped in 14 University Disciplinary Areas (UDAs). Of the 
184 CSs, ANVUR classifies 109 as “bibliometric”, and the remaining 75 as “non-
bibliometric”. The call for appointments to the judging committees is open to all full 
professors categorized in the particular CS. In the most recent call, professors seeking 
appointment were to present an application including indications of their scientific 
production: from this, ANVUR calculated three specific indicators (which were 
different for the bibliometric and non-bibliometric CSs). The request for appointment 
was eligible if all the indicators showed values above the median for the distribution of 
all full professors in the CS,6 otherwise it was immediately rejected. The committee of 
four Italian academics was then formed by random draw from all the candidates that 
passed the bibliometric test. The Italian committee members were also joined by a fifth 
member, selected at random from a list of academics working in OECD nations, whose 
candidatures had again been screened by ANVUR. 
The call for candidates to the habilitation is instead issued on an annual basis. 
Applicants must apply for specific CSs and ranks, however there is no limit on the 
number of CSs requested, and applicants can also request habilitation to both associate 
and full professor at the same time. For the 2012 call, there were also no minimum 
requirements for admissibility to the competitions. The candidatures were to be 
accompanied by a curriculum vitae and a list of the individual’s degrees and scientific 
publications. The latter served for the calculation of three indicators. For the “non-
bibliometric” CSs, the same indicators were applied for the evaluation of the candidates 
to habilitation and for the applicants to committee positions: i) the number of 
monographs (only those with ISBN); ii) the number of articles in a set of journals 
indicated by ANVUR, or as part of monographs with ISBN; iii) the number of articles 
in top-ranked journals, as selected by ANVUR. 
For the “bibliometric” CSs the indicators were not identical, but still similar to those 
used for the selection of the committee members. For the candidates to habilitation, they 
were:7 
 number of articles in journals over the period 2002-2012, with normalization in the 
case of academic “age” less than 10 years (calculated beginning from the first year 
of publication); 
 number of citations received for the overall scientific production, normalized for the 
academic age of the candidate; 
 contemporary h-index (Sidiropoulos et al., 2007) of the overall scientific production. 
The above indicators were calculated on the basis of the publications indexed in two 
major commercial bibliometric sources: Scopus and Web of Science (WoS). In the case 
of publications indexed in both sources, the value of citations assigned was the higher of 
                                                          
6 The database of the publications used to calculate the median for Italian professors is not made available 
to the public, but contains only publications voluntarily inserted by any and all individual professors of 
Italian universities. 
7 For the applicants to the committee-member positions, judging was on the quantity and impact of 
production over their entire careers, without any normalization for years of academic service. 
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the two. 
Beginning from a database of all the publications entered by Italian professors over 
the course of 2012, ANVUR proceeded to calculate the different indicators for full and 
associate professors and then published the median values, to serve in the selection of 
both the committee-members and their subsequent evaluations of the candidates. 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for the 2012 call for habilitations. The 
response was over 59,148 applications, more than one sixth of which were for Medicine 
(9,987), followed by Ancient history, philology, literature, art (6,324 applications, 
10.7% of total) and Biology (6,244 applications, 10.6% of total). At the bottom of the 
list was Earth sciences, with only 1,231, for 2.1% of the total. The requests for full 
professor habilitation were 30.5% of the total: the detail per UDA shows the maximum 
incidence was in Mathematics and computer science (36.6%), followed by Economics 
and statistics (36.2%). The lowest incidence of requests for full professor habilitation 
was in Political and social sciences (24.2%). 
 
Table 1: Statistics for the 2012 Italian scientific habilitation (elaborated by the authors from data 
published on the site for the habilitation - http://abilitazione.miur.it/public/candidati.php?sersel=50&)* 
UDA 
CS 
Of which 
“bibliometric” 
Applications 
Of which for 
full professor 
01 - Mathematics and computer science (MAT) 7 7 2,492 911 (36.6%) 
02 - Physics (PHY) 6 6 4,372 1,451 (33.2%) 
03 - Chemistry (CHE) 8 8 2,344 695 (29.7%) 
04 - Earth sciences (EAR) 4 4 1,231 400 (32.5%) 
05 - Biology (BIO) 13 13 6,244 1,690 (27.1%) 
06 - Medicine (MED) 26 26 9,987 3,298 (33.0%) 
07 - Agricultural and veterinary sciences (AVS) 14 14 2,093 650 (31.1%) 
08 - Civil engineering and architecture (CE) 12 7 3,599 1,027 (28.5%) 
09 - Industrial and information engineering (IIE) 20 20 4,535 1,573 (34.7%) 
10 - Ancient history, philology, literature, art (LIT) 19 0 6,324 1,718 (27.2%) 
11 - History, philosophy, pedagogy, psychology (PP) 17 4 5,909 1,491 (25.2%) 
12 - Law (LAW) 16 0 3,037 887 (29.2%) 
13 - Economics and statistics (ECS) 15 0 4,853 1,755 (36.2%) 
14 - Political and social sciences (POL) 7 0 2,128 515 (24.2%) 
Total 184 109 59,148 18,061 (30.5%) 
* The regulations dictated that after 60 days from the publication of the committee decisions, the data 
would be obscured. The site now lists only the successfully habilitated candidates. 
 
To understand the scope of this evaluation procedure, Table 2 indicates the 
numerosity of the applicants per UDA in relation to the national academic staff in the 
same UDA. The 59,148 applications were presented by 40,228 candidates. There were 
an average of 1.47 applications per candidate: 72% presented only one application; 18% 
presented two; 8% presented between 3 and 5 applications, and 1% presented more than 
5. Each candidate on average applied for 1.34 CSs (3,714 candidates applied to both 
associate and full professor positions in the same CS; 818 of them in more than one 
CS). 
Over half the candidates (55.7%) were already on faculty staff at an Italian 
university8. Physics was the UDA “most open” to candidatures from outside the 
                                                          
8 To isolate all those candidates who were already on staff at national universities, the data downloaded 
from the habilitation website were crossed with those from the MIUR database on teaching staff 
(cercauniversita.cineca.it/php5/docenti/cerca.php, last accessed on 01/07/2015). An algorithm for 
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university sphere: only a third of the applications came from candidates already on 
faculty. This is traditionally a strong area of the national scientific system, as also 
witnessed by the significant numbers and dimensions of physics research institutes 
outside the university system. Many scientists in such research institutes saw the 
“habilitation” as an opportunity to acquire a form of additional qualification for their 
internal career progression, or for the option of a potential shift to the academic sphere. 
On the opposite front, in Economics and statistics and Mathematics and computer 
science, over two thirds of the total applicants were already on faculty in Italian 
universities. 
Applicants outnumber full and associate professors already on staff in the total 
Italian faculty. The applications exceed the numbers of the existing staff in all UDAS 
except in Law: in Physics the 3,122 applicants are over twice the full and associate 
professors already on staff. Of the existing assistant and associate professors, 52.3% 
applied for habilitation, with a peak in Political and social sciences (66.1%), followed 
by Ancient history, philology, literature, art (65.9%) and by Physics (64.9%). The 
lowest percentage was registered in Chemistry (47.1%). 
 
Table 2: Incidence of applicants in total national research staff 
UDA 
Total 
applicants (a) 
Of which on 
faculty (b) 
Total Associate + 
Full professors (c) 
Total Assistant + 
Associate professors (d) 
a/c 
(%) 
b/d 
(%) 
01-MAT 2,072 1,386 (66.9%) 1,827 2,293 113.4 60.4 
02-PHY 3,122 1,110 (35.6%) 1,264 1,711 247.0 64.9 
03-CHE 1,695 1,082 (63.8%) 1,513 2,295 112.0 47.1 
04-EAR 973 404 (41.5%) 565 828 172.2 48.8 
05-BIO 3,961 1,905 (48.1%) 2,385 3,769 166.1 50.5 
06-MED 7,354 3,798 (51.6%) 4,799 7,845 153.2 48.4 
07-AVS 1,811 1,100 (60.7%) 1,613 2,295 112.3 47.9 
08-CE 3,075 1,690 (55.0%) 1,938 2,686 158.7 62.9 
09-IIE 3,561 2,171 (61.0%) 3,015 3,800 118.1 57.1 
10-LIT 5,126 2,565 (50.0%) 2,818 3,891 181.9 65.9 
11-PP 4,442 2,157 (48.6%) 2,640 3,467 168.3 62.2 
12-LAW 2,428 1,580 (65.1%) 2,667 3,285 91.0 48.1 
13-ECS 2,922 1,966 (67.3%) 2,793 3,317 104.6 59.3 
14-POL 1,665 8,76 (52.6%) 877 1,326 189.9 66.1 
Total 40,228 22,404 (55.7%) 30,714 42,808 131.0 52.3 
 
 
4. Analyses of the 2012 habilitation results 
 
Our analysis is limited to the “bibliometric” CSs alone, because these are the ones 
where the use of bibliometric parameters and indicators, such as those applied in the 
habilitation, permits reliability and robustness in the evaluation of the candidates. There 
are two UDAs that include both bibliometric and non-bibliometric CSs: Civil 
engineering and architecture, and History, philosophy, pedagogy, psychology. For these 
UDAs our analysis refers only to the bibliometric CSs alone. For convenience we refer 
to these UDAs by the acronyms CE (Civil engineering) and PP (Pedagogy and 
psychology), after the names of the bibliometric CSs contained. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
disambiguation was applied to resolve cases of homonymy. In several hundred cases the disambiguation 
was verified manually. 
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From the open-access habilitation website9 we have downloaded the data for each 
candidate (family and first names; sector(s) of competition; full and/or associate 
professor habilitation sought). For each individual we have also downloaded the values 
of the bibliometric indicators measured by MIUR from the scientific production 
declared, as well as the final result of the evaluation (habilitated, not habilitated). From 
the website we have also taken the national medians for the indicators used, and the 
composition of the examining committees. 
Roughly 36,000 applications for habilitation arrived, referring to 109 bibliometric 
sectors, and 60% of total applications. Less than a third of the applications are for 
habilitation to full professor, with the maximum value (36.6%) in Mathematics and the 
minimum (26.0%) in Pedagogy and psychology. 
Of the total applications, 51.4% were presented by assistant and associate professors 
already on staff at Italian universities, with a maximum in Mathematics (67.2%) and a 
minimum in Physics (37%). The applications by incumbents are particularly 
concentrated on habilitation to full professor (67.4% in total) with a peak in Civil 
engineering, at 84.4%. The applications for habilitation to associate professor are 43.9% 
of total, with a maximum in Mathematics (60%) and a minimum in Physics (31.3%). 
Habilitation was awarded to 44.6% of the candidates, with identical incidence for 
both academic ranks considered (Table 3). The detail by UDA reveals that in reality the 
percentage habilitated varies greatly between the disciplines: the minimum value occurs 
in Pedagogy and psychology (27.5% for full professors and 35.4% for associates); this 
is also the UDA where the difference between the two percentages is greatest. In 
Chemistry, the percentage of habilitated candidates is particularly high, at 55.7% for the 
lower rank and 56.6% for the higher one. Agricultural and veterinary sciences features 
the highest percentage of candidates habilitated to full professor (57.4%), compared to 
51.8% of candidates being habilitated to associate. Exactly the opposite balance occurs 
in Earth sciences: 37% of the candidates for full professor are habilitated, against 44.2% 
for the candidates to associate. Isolating those applications for habilitation presented by 
candidates already in the national faculty, we note that in general there is a higher 
percentage of habilitations awarded (49.7% for candidates to full professor, 57.0% for 
those to associate) than we see among the applicants that are not on faculty (34.1% for 
full professor and 34.9% for associate). Among the “incumbent” candidates the peak of 
incidence for habilitation to full professor occurs in Agricultural and veterinary sciences 
(61.7%); for habilitation to associate professor the peak is in Physics (70.8%). The 
minimum is in Pedagogy and psychology, both for the full professor (36.9%) and 
associate professor (49.9%) habilitation. The success rate for non-faculty applicants 
shows a minimum for candidates to full professor in Pedagogy and psychology (5.4%), 
and in Civil engineering (19.3%) for candidates to associate professor. 
 
  
                                                          
9 http://abilitazione.miur.it/public/pubblicarisultati.php, last accessed 01/07/2015. Unfortunately the 
regulations dictated that after 60 days from the publication of the committee decisions, the data would be 
obscured. The site now lists only the successfully accredited candidates. 
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Table 3: Rates of success per UDA, academic rank and type of applicant  
UDA 
Habilitated total (%) 
Habilitated  
among faculty (%) 
Habilitated  
non-faculty (%) 
Full Associate Full Associate Full Associate 
01-MAT 39.1 45.2 42.8 55.4 24.5 29.9 
02-PHY 52.4 57.4 58.9 70.8 46.2 51.3 
03-CHE 55.7 56.6 58.7 69.4 45.6 40.8 
04-EAR 37.0 44.2 47.4 65.4 24.9 32.7 
05-BIO 45.1 41.2 48.5 53.1 39.8 34.2 
06-MED 41.8 39.9 46.1 46.3 33.1 35.1 
07-AVS 57.4 51.8 61.7 67.3 42.4 35.0 
08-CE 36.4 39.2 40.0 55.0 16.7 19.3 
09-IIE 44.0 42.4 52.9 63.2 15.7 21.4 
11-PP 27.5 35.4 36.9 49.9 5.4 24.0 
Total 44.6 44.6 49.7 57.0 34.1 34.9 
 
The rate of success for assistant and associate professors already on staff at Italian 
universities was thus higher than for non-academic candidates. To verify if this 
corresponded to an equally better scientific profile, we conduct a statistical analysis 
relating the probability of success of the candidates with the only variables that we can 
measure for all the candidates: their being already (or not) on faculty and their 
bibliometric performance. For the statistical model we choose the logistic regression 
function (rendered linear through the logit function), which is particularly suited for 
modelling dichotomous dependent variables. Formally, the statistical model is 
described: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑝) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋1 + 𝛽2𝑋2 
 [1] 
Where: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑝) = 𝑙𝑜𝑔
𝑝(𝐸)
1−𝑝(𝐸)
 
E = 1 if the applicant was habilitated; otherwise 0; 
p(E) = probability of event E; 
β = generic regression coefficient; 
𝑋1= applicant’s bibliometric performance; 
𝑋2 = 1 if the applicant was already on faculty as of 31/12/2012; otherwise 0. 
The explicative variable 𝑋1 equals the average of the normalized values of each 
indicator.10 Values of each indicator are normalized to the median of the distribution of 
professors of the rank and the CS to which the candidate applied. We give the example 
calculation of a candidate for habilitation to full professor in CS 09/B3 (Engineering 
and management). Table 4 illustrates the calculation 𝑋1 (last row). In this case the 
performance 𝑋1 of the candidate is 3.56 (average of the ratios of the candidate’s values 
for the three indicators to the relevant medians of the distribution of all full professors in 
CS 09/B3). 
 
                                                          
10 Our averaging of the indicators implies the assumption that each had equal importance and impact on 
the final decision by the committee. However we observe that the Spearman index of correlation between 
the second and third indicators is 0.94. This could have induced the committee members to give greater 
relative weight to the first indicator. Still, in the minutes of the meetings where the evaluation criteria 
were declared, the committees give no indication of any such differentiation, therefore our assumption of 
equal arithmetic weight appears the correct one. 
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Table 4: Example calculation of bibliometric performance based on the three indicators used in the 
habilitation  
Index 
Value for the candidate 
Median for full 
professors in 09/B3 
Ratio 
1 -Articles in journals over years 2002-2012 43 7 6.14 
2 -Normalized citations 17.82 7 2.55 
3 - Contemporary h-index 10 5 2.00 
 
 
𝑋1 = 3.56 
 
Table 5 presents the result of the regressions, aggregating the observations by UDA, 
for the habilitation to full professor. The p-values for z-test indicate that in all the 
UDAs, the second variable (𝑋2) is significant. We recall that the value of the Odds 
Ratio, OR (i.e. e) equals 1 when the associated explanatory variable has no effect on 
the dependent variable. In fact in all the UDAs, the OR associated with 𝑋2 is well over 
1, with a peak in Pedagogy and psychology (10.529) and also a very high value in 
Industrial and information engineering (6.906). However 𝑋1results as non-significant in 
UDAs 1, 7, 8 and 11. In these UDAs the committees must have adopted additional 
evaluation criteria whose weight was evidently higher than given bibliometric 
indicators. The comparison of the standardized coefficients (1Std and 2Std)11, shows that 
there are only three UDAs (Chemistry, Biology and Medicine) where we can affirm 
with certainty that bibliometric performance has greater influence than being 
“incumbent” on the success of a candidate. In the other UDAs the scarce explanatory 
power of the estimates does not allow to reach any conclusions on the determinant of 
success of a candidate. 
 
Table 5: Logistic regression results predicting habilitation outcomes for full professor 
UDA Obs 
Log pseudo 
likelihood 
PseudoR2 
X1 (Bibliometric performance) X2 (Incumbent vs newcomer) 
 p>|z| OR Std  p>|z| OR Std 
01-MAT 911 -598.41 0.018 -0.013 0.255 0.987 -0.060 0.822*** 0 2.274 0.330 
02-PHY 1,451 -985.18 0.019 0.145*** 0.006 1.156 0.210 0.526*** 0 1.692 0.263 
03-CHE 695 -423.19 0.113 1.372*** 0 3.942 1.325 0.645*** 0.001 1.906 0.271 
04-EAR 400 -239.77 0.090 0.373*** 0 1.452 0.577 1.198*** 0 3.315 0.598 
05-BIO 1,690 -1080.12 0.072 0.784*** 0 2.191 0.746 0.380*** 0 1.462 0.185 
06-MED 3,298 -2069.86 0.076 0.534*** 0 1.706 0.813 0.642*** 0 1.901 0.303 
07-AVS 650 -432.23 0.025 0.026 0.426 1.026 0.244 0.797*** 0 2.218 0.331 
08-CE 385 -242.70 0.038 0.088 0.196 1.092 0.301 1.358*** 0.001 3.888 0.493 
09-IIE 1,573 -971.03 0.100 0.223** 0.013 1.250 0.436 1.932*** 0 6.906 0.825 
11-PP 374 -194.92 0.115 0.076 0.136 1.079 0.213 2.354*** 0 10.529 1.077 
Dependent variable: habilitation outcome; method of estimation: logistic regression QMLE;  = raw 
coefficient; Std= X standardized coefficient. OR= Odds Ratio (exp ). z = z-score for test of =0; p>|z| 
= p-value for z-test; Statistical significance: * p-value <0.10, ** p-value <0.05, *** p-value <0.01. 
 
The results of the analyses concerning the habilitation to associate professors are 
presented in Table 6. The regressors are significant in all UDAs except in Pedagogy and 
psychology for 𝑋1. For variable X2, the lowest OR is observed in Medicine (1.729). In 
all the other UDAs, OR is greater than 2, and in three UDAs (Agriculture and veterinary 
sciences, Civil engineering, Industrial and information engineering) it is even greater 
than 4. The comparison between Std and Std indicates that in Mathematics, Physics, 
                                                          
11 We can compare the effects of these two variables only through the standardized coefficients, since X1 
and X2 are measured in different metrics. 
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Earth sciences, Civil engineering and Industrial engineering, the fact of being 
incumbent had greater impact than scientific performance in determining the 
candidate’s success. 
 
Table 6: Logistic regression results predicting habilitation outcomes for associate professor 
UDA Obs 
Log pseudo 
likelihood 
PseudoR2 
X1 (bibliometric performance) X2 (incumbent vs new comer) 
 p>|z| OR Std  p>|z| OR Std 
01-MAT 1,581 -1027.99 0.056 0.142*** 0.005 1.153 0.238 1.105*** 0 3.020 0.542 
02-PHY 2,921 -1927.94 0.033 0.118*** 0.001 1.125 0.230 0.833*** 0 2.300 0.386 
03-CHE 1,649 -911.78 0.192 1.768*** 0 5.857 1.449 1.039*** 0 2.828 0.517 
04-EAR 831 -518.32 0.091 0.187*** 0.002 1.206 0.380 1.366*** 0 3.918 0.652 
05-BIO 4,554 -2780.13 0.099 0.770*** 0 2.160 0.845 0.722*** 0 2.059 0.349 
06-MED 6,689 -3921.52 0.128 0.730*** 0 2.076 1.381 0.548*** 0 1.729 0.271 
07-AVS 1,443 -873.64 0.126 0.347*** 0 1.415 0.806 1.435*** 0 4.201 0.717 
08-CE 735 -424.72 0.137 0.198** 0.01 1.219 0.554 1.743*** 0 5.714 0.867 
09-IIE 2,962 -1728.99 0.144 0.149*** 0.006 1.161 0.262 1.867*** 0 6.471 0.934 
11-PP 1,064 -653.01 0.056 -0.009 0.473 0.991 -0.043 1.143*** 0 3.137 0.568 
Dependent variable: habilitation outcome; method of estimation: logistic regression QMLE;  = raw 
coefficient; Std= X standardized coefficient. OR= Odds Ratio (exp ). z = z-score for test of =0; p>|z| 
= p-value for z-test; Statistical significance: * p-value <0.10, ** p-value <0.05, *** p-value <0.01. 
 
We note that in any case, the general statistics for the fitting parameters (columns 3 
and 4 of Tables 6 and 7) indicate a scarce capacity of these two variables to alone 
explain the outcome of the evaluations conducted by the committees. For this, in the 
next section we consider three other potential explicative variables. To do this we must 
restrict the analyses to incumbents alone, for whom we have detailed information 
concerning the candidates’ academic career and research production. 
 
 
4.2 Determinants of the habilitation outcome for incumbents: social proximity vs 
scientific merit 
 
The influence of social proximity between applicant and evaluator has already been 
examined by Abramo et al. (2014b), concerning its effects on efficiency of the selection 
for career advancement in Italian universities. Along the same lines, we now investigate 
the influence of social proximity on the habilitation outcome for incumbents, 
distinguishing two types of candidate-evaluator links: 
 institutional link: the candidate is from the same university as the evaluators, at 
least for one year in the period 2003-2012; 
 professional link: the candidate has co-authored publications with his/her 
evaluators, in the same period. 
We thus examine the careers of both the applicants and evaluators to determine if 
the applicant spent at least one year in the same university as his or her evaluators, over 
the period 2003-201212. 
Instances of shared professional work can be objectively measured by the proxy of 
publications in co-authorship. To analyze the influence of such candidate-evaluator 
research collaborations on habilitation outcomes we selected the 2003-2012 
                                                          
12 The data on careers were extracted from cercauniversita.cineca.it/php5/docenti/cerca.php, last accessed 
01/07/2015. 
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publications indexed in WoS13. 
Finally, considering the importance of belonging to a domestic academic community 
in a context (as in Italy’s) where the scientific sector (the CS) is effectively the sphere of 
governance for both the individual and the collective’s interests, we consider a further 
variable that discriminates between the incumbents on faculty in the same CS as the 
committee, and those on faculty in other CSs14. Finally, for the analysis of the 
habilitation to full professor, we discriminate the applicants already on staff as associate 
professors and as assistant professors (“ricercatore”, in Italian), hypothesizing that 
beyond scientific merit, the committees could have also more or less formally applied 
hierarchical criteria. Formally, for the analysis of habilitations to full professor, the 
statistical model is described: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑝) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋1 + 𝛽2𝑋2 + 𝛽3𝑋3 + 𝛽4𝑋4 + 𝛽5𝑋5 
 [2] 
Where: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑝) = 𝑙𝑜𝑔
𝑝(𝐸)
1−𝑝(𝐸)
 
E = 1 if the applicant was habilitated; otherwise 0; 
p(E) = probability of event E; 
β = generic regression coefficient; 
𝑋1= applicant’s bibliometric performance;  
𝑋2 = 1 if the applicant was affiliated with the same university as at least one member of 
the committee, at least for a year over the period 2003-2012; otherwise 0; 
𝑋3= 1 if the applicant co-authored at least one publication with at least one member of 
the committee over the period 2003-2012, otherwise 0; 
𝑋4= 1 if at 31/12/2012, the applicant officially belonged to the same CS as that for the 
committee; otherwise 0; 
𝑋5= 1 if the applicant is an associate professor at 31/12/2012; otherwise 0. 
For the habilitations to associate professor, the model is identical except for the 
absence of variable X5. 
Table 7 presents the results from the regressions for the habilitations to full 
professor. The candidates’ bibliometric performance has a greater impact than other 
regressors in five UDAs out of ten (Chemistry, Earth sciences, Biology, Medicine and 
Civil engineering) and is not significant in two (Mathematics and Agricultural and 
veterinary science). The candidate’s belonging to the same CS as the committee had an 
impact that was significant in all the UDAs, and superior to the impact of all the other 
regressors in five UDAs (Mathematics, Physics, and Agricultural and veterinary 
science, Industrial and information engineering, Psychology and pedagogy). 
The institutional proximity (X2) had a significant impact in all the UDAs except 
Physics and Agricultural and veterinary science; professional proximity (X3) does not 
show significant impact in Chemistry and Earth sciences. 
                                                          
13 The bibliometric dataset used to identify co-authorships is extracted from the Italian Observatory of 
Public Research (ORP), a database developed and maintained by the authors and derived under license 
from the Thomson Reuters WoS. Beginning from the raw data of the WoS, and applying a complex 
algorithm for reconciliation of the author’s affiliation and disambiguation of the true identity of the 
authors, each publication (article, article review and conference proceeding) is attributed to the university 
scientist or scientists that produced it (for details, see D’Angelo et al., 2011). 
14We recall that a candidate can apply for habilitation in different CSs, other than the one where he or she 
is officially categorized by the MIUR. 
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The analysis for habilitation to associate professor (Table 8) reveals a situation that 
is clearly different than the preceding one, even though there are some elements of 
continuity. The impact of bibliometric performance is significant in all the UDAs except 
in Physics. The candidate’s belonging to the same CS as the committee has an impact 
that is significant in all the UDAs and higher than that of all the other regressors in 
Physics, Earth sciences, Industrial and information engineering, and Psychology and 
pedagogy. In the remaining UDAs, it is bibliometric performance that has a greater 
impact. Institutional proximity has a significant impact in only three UDAs and 
professional proximity in all UDAs but two. 
In extreme summary and even though there are evident differences between the 
UDAs, the determinants seem to have different weights according to whether the 
habilitation is to associate or to full professor: in the first case the bibliometric 
performance seems to have had a much greater weight than for habilitation to full 
professor. In general, belonging to a CS different from that of the committee seems to 
penalize the candidates, as does the academic rank of assistant professor in the 
habilitations to full professor. 
To give a quantitative idea of the weight of the single variables on the probability of 
habilitation of a candidate, we give an example from UDA 9-Industrial and information 
engineering. We will compare two candidates with bibliometric scores (X1 = 3) three 
times greater than the benchmark: the first officially belongs to the CS where he or she 
is applying, the second does not. We begin with the habilitation to associate professor. 
A simulation conducted on the logistic regression results indicates that the “non-
member” of the CS has a 49% probability of being habilitated. The individual’s chances 
rise to 52% if he or she shows a link of institutional proximity to at least one of the 
committee members; to 56% if the person presents a link of professional proximity, and 
to 59% if there are both links. The “CS member” instead has a 79% probability of being 
habilitated and the probability rises by two points for each proximity link with the 
committee. Now we consider the habilitation to full professor. Both the candidates in 
the example are associate professors with a performance three times superior to the 
benchmark: the first, on faculty in a CS different than the one where the individual is 
applying, has a 15% probability of being habilitated, rising to 19% in the presence of 
either social link, and to 22% in the presence of both. The second individual, belonging 
to the CS of application, instead has a 41% probability of success, rising to 46% in the 
presence of a link of institutional proximity with the committee; to 48% in the presence 
of a professional link and to 53% in the presence of both. Finally, we analyze the other 
possible situation: an associate-professor and an assistant-professor candidate, both 
belonging to the same CS as the committee, both with a performance five times greater 
than the benchmark. For the habilitation to full professor, the assistant professor has a 
75% probability of success, while the associate professor has an 87% probability. 
 
Table 7: Logistic regression results predicting outcomes for academic incumbents applying to full professor habilitation 
    
Constant X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 
UDA Obs. 
Log pseudo 
likelihood 
PseudoR2  P>z Std P>z Std P>z Std P>z Std P>z Std P>z 
01-MAT 727 -449,45 0,094 -2.301*** 0 0.183 0.446 0.159** 0.045 0.181** 0.033 0.604*** 0 0.426*** 0 
02-PHY 706 -426,63 0,108 -1.658*** 0 0.294** 0.038 0.150 0.118 0.167* 0.094 0.628*** 0 0.355*** 0 
03-CHE 537 -308,67 0,152 -3.179*** 0 1.430*** 0 0.310*** 0.005 0.078 0.474 0.455*** 0 0.095 0.362 
04-EAR 215 -122,22 0,178 -4.391*** 0 1.035*** 0.001 0.249* 0.083 0.063 0.707 0.794*** 0.003 0.551*** 0.001 
05-BIO 1035 -643,42 0,103 -2.431*** 0 0.705*** 0 0.233*** 0.001 0.302*** 0 0.329*** 0 0.282*** 0 
06-MED 2192 -1285,16 0,151 -3.169*** 0 1.077*** 0 0.166*** 0.001 0.333*** 0 0.528*** 0 0.389*** 0 
07-AVS 506 -284,86 0,154 -2.643*** 0 0.524 0.546 0.139 0.204 0.248** 0.029 0.960*** 0 0.087 0.389 
08-CE 286 -148,54 0,246 -4.072*** 0 1.518*** 0 0.345** 0.020 0.415* 0.091 - - 1.065*** 0 
09-IIE 1197 -558,23 0,326 -6.081*** 0 1.157*** 0 0.292*** 0 0.196** 0.024 1.375*** 0 0.865*** 0 
11-PP 263 -119,95 0,307 -6.072*** 0 0.708* 0.091 0.279* 0.079 0.367** 0.022 1.436*** 0 1.100*** 0.001 
X1= bibliometric performance; X2=applic/evaluat. institutional proximity; X3= applic/evaluat. coauthorships; X4=application in the same CS of the applicant; 
X5=applicant associate professor. Dependent variable: habilitation outcome; method of estimation: logistic regression QMLE;  = raw coefficient; Std= X 
standardized coefficient. z = z-score for test of =0; p>|z| = p-value for z-test; Statistical significance: * p-value <0.10, ** p-value <0.05, *** p-value <0.01 
 
Table 8: Logistic regression results predicting outcomes for academic incumbents applying to associate professor habilitation 
    
Constant X1 X2 X3 X4 
UDA Obs. 
Log pseudo 
likelihood 
PseudoR2  P>z Std P>z Std P>z Std P>z Std P>z 
01-MAT 948 -600,88 0,078 -1.427*** 0 0.682*** 0 0.004 0.959 0.425*** 0 0.376*** 0 
02-PHY 913 -492,74 0,107 -0.404** 0.045 0.297 0.14 0.071 0.403 0.133 0.166 0.721*** 0 
03-CHE 912 -437,97 0,220 -3.637*** 0 2.138*** 0 0.281*** 0.004 -0.047 0.602 0.633*** 0 
04-EAR 292 -162,06 0,139 -1.796*** 0.001 0.586 0.108 0.226 0.129 0.332* 0.094 0.792*** 0 
05-BIO 1674 -1052,68 0,090 -1.672*** 0 0.907*** 0 -0.005 0.927 0.124**ì 0.02 0.304*** 0 
06-MED 2866 -1566,03 0,209 -2.973*** 0 1.809*** 0 0.006 0.899 0.393*** 0 0.612*** 0 
07-AVS 749 -358,97 0,242 -3.662*** 0 2.405*** 0 0.244** 0.019 0.326*** 0.004 0.842*** 0 
08-CE 409 -227,58 0,191 -3.572*** 0 1.096** 0.022 0.047 0.703 0.527*** 0.003 1.048*** 0 
09-IIE 1490 -706,36 0,280 -3.372*** 0 1.108*** 0 0.140* 0.056 0.271*** 0.001 1.365*** 0 
11-PP 469 -253,93 0,219 -2.809*** 0 0.258* 0.081 0.334*** 0.002 0.233** 0.015 1.338*** 0 
X1= bibliometric performance; X2=applic/evaluat. institutional proximity; X3= applic/evaluat. coauthorships; X4=application in the same CS of the applicant. 
Dependent variable: habilitation outcome; method of estimation: logistic regression QMLE;  = raw coefficient; Std= X standardized coefficient. z = z-score for test 
of =0; p>|z| = p-value for z-test; Statistical significance: * p-value <0.10, ** p-value <0.05, *** p-value <0.01. 
5. Discrimination and favoritism 
 
The nationally governed competitions for faculty positions have come under 
frequent fire, and the Italian word “concorso” has gained international note for its 
implications of rigged competition, favoritism, nepotism and other unfair selection 
practices (Gerosa, 2001). Letters in prestigious journals such as The Lancet, Science 
and Nature (Garattini, 2001; Aiuti et al., 1994; Biggin, 1994; Amadori et al., 1992; 
Gaetani and Ferraris 1991; Fabbri, 1987), as well as entire monographs, (Perotti, 2008; 
Zagaria, 2007) continue to report on injustice in recruitment, including many cases that 
arrive in judicial proceedings. The habilitation competitions were conceived to contrast 
unfair selection practices, through the introduction of bibliometric indicators in the 
evaluation process. 
In this section we attempt to quantify the numerosity of cases of probable 
discrimination and favoritism that may have occurred in the evaluation of candidates to 
associate and full professor habilitation. The operative definitions of discrimination and 
favoritism are based on the observation of bibliometric performance alone and vary 
according to three distinct scenarios: 
Scenario 1 (restrictive) 
 Favored candidates are those habilitated in a CS that: i) do not exceed any median; 
ii) are in the bottom 10% of the distribution of bibliometric performance for the 
candidates; and in any case iii) show performance that is less than that of at least one 
rejected candidate. 
 Candidates subject to discrimination are those that were not habilitated that: i) 
exceeded all three medians; and ii) are in the top 10% of the bibliometric 
performance distribution for the candidates. 
Scenario 2 (broad) 
 Favored candidates are those habilitated that did not exceed all three medians. 
 “Discriminated” candidates are those not habilitated that exceeded all three medians. 
Scenario 3 (intermediate) 
 Favored candidates are those habilitated that: i) did not exceed all three medians; 
and ii) had a bibliometric performance at least 20 percentile points less than that of a 
candidate that was rejected for habilitation in the CS. 
 Candidates subject to discrimination are those that were not habilitated that: i) 
exceeded all three medians; and ii) had a bibliometric performance at least 20 
percentile points greater than a candidate that was habilitated in the CS. 
For the “intermediate” scenario, the threshold of 20 points of difference responds to 
a logic of compensation for potential qualitative differences in the profiles of the 
candidates, in other dimensions than those monitored by the three bibliometric 
indicators. 
For ease of communication, in the following subsections we omit the adjective 
“probable” in discussing the discrimination and favoritism that are the subject of 
investigation. The objectives of the analysis is to identify those CSs where the 
committee’s work would deserve further investigation, for purposes of remedying any 
inefficiencies in selection. 
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5.1 Analysis of cases of discrimination 
 
Table 9 summarizes the analysis concerning cases of discrimination. Adopting the 
definition of first scenario, the candidates subject to discrimination are 6.8% of the non-
habilitated to full professor and 5.9% of the non-habilitated to associate. The 
percentages rise to 30% and beyond under scenarios 2 and 3, with a peak of 38.6% in 
scenario 2 for the lower rank. Scenario 2 presents 71 CSs (almost 2/3 of the total 109) 
where the percentage of “discriminated” among non-habilitated to full professor is 
observed at over 30%; in the case of associate professors under scenario 2, there are 49 
such CSs. For scenario 3 (intermediate), this same percentage of discriminated (30% 
among non-habilitated) affects 61 CSs for the habilitation to full professor and 45 for 
that to associate. Thus in general, the frequency of cases of discrimination appears 
highly relevant, and in every case is greater for the habilitation to full professor than for 
that to associate. This last observation is in line with what emerged in the regression 
analysis, where between the two ranks of habilitation there was a clearly different 
weight of the bibliometric performance on evaluation outcomes. 
 
Table 9: Cases of probable discrimination in the three scenarios under analysis 
Habilitation to rank of Full professor Associate 
Total candidates 11,427 24,429 
Accredited 5,099 10,901 
Discriminated (% of total non-accredited): Scenario 1 6.8% 5.9% 
Discriminated (% of total non-accredited): Scenario 2 38.6% 30.5% 
Discriminated (% of total non-accredited): Scenario 3 35.1% 29.0% 
No. sectors with % discriminated > 10%: Scenario 1 24 (of 109) 14 (of 109) 
No. sectors with % discriminated > 30%: Scenario 2 71 (of 109) 49 (of 109) 
No. sectors with % discriminated > 30%: Scenario 3 61 (of 109) 45 (of 109) 
 
Because candidates were allowed to seek habilitation in more than one CSs, and a 
large number of them did, it may be the case that failures, notwithstanding high 
bibliometric performances, cannot be regarded as discrimination, rather as inadequate fit 
of the candidate with the competition sector. We therefore repeated the above analysis 
to candidates seeking habilitation in one CS only. Results are reported in Table 10. 
 
Table 10: Cases of probable discrimination in the three scenarios under analysis (candidates seeking 
habilitation in one CS only) 
Habilitation to rank of Full professor Associate 
Total candidates 4,717 11,134 
Habilitated 1,588 4,061 
Discriminated (% of total non-accredited): Scenario 1 10.2% 9.4% 
Discriminated (% of total non-accredited): Scenario 2 49.5% 39.3% 
Discriminated (% of total non-accredited): Scenario 3 46.0% 38.0% 
No. sectors with % discriminated > 10%: Scenario 1 47 (of 109) 49 (of 109) 
No. sectors with % discriminated > 30%: Scenario 2 82 (of 109) 70 (of 109) 
No. sectors with % discriminated > 30%: Scenario 3 78 (of 109) 68 (of 109) 
 
The habilitation rate is lower for the above canditates: 36.5% as compared to 44.6% 
for candidates to associate professors; and 33.7% as compared to 44.6% for candidates 
to full professors. Discrimination rates, consistenly, increase for both academic ranks. 
We now explore the discrimination rates for incumbents and outsiders for all 
candidate (Table 11) and for those applying to a CS only (Table 12). Results show 
higher discrimination rates for candidates from outside the academia when considering 
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all candidates, but no differences when considering candidates to one CS only. 
 
Table 11: Cases of probable discrimination for incumbents and outsiders in the three scenarios under 
analysis 
 
Full professor  Associate professor 
 
Incumbents Outsiders  Incumbents Outsiders 
Scenario 1 5.5% 8.7%  5.1% 6.3% 
Scenario 2 35.7% 43.2%  27.7% 32.0% 
Scenario 3 31.9% 40.1%  26.3% 30.4% 
 
Table 12: Cases of probable discrimination for incumbents and outsiders (candidates seeking 
habilitation in one CS only) 
 
Full professor  Associate professor 
 
Incumbents Outsiders  Incumbents Outsiders 
Scenario 1 9.4% 11.1%  10.3% 9.1% 
Scenario 2 50.0% 49.0%  42.7% 38.0% 
Scenario 3 45.9% 46.1%  41.1% 36.8% 
 
With reference to all candidates, the data concerning the discrimination rates, when 
disaggregated by competition sector, permit identification of the CSs with the greatest 
concentration of critical cases. In this regard, Table 13 lists the first 10 sectors by 
concentration of discriminated candidates among the total of non-habilitated, for each of 
the three scenarios. We observe a massive presence of sectors under UDA 9 (Industrial 
and information engineering): from three to five sectors for the higher-rank habilitation, 
depending on the scenario, and from three to four sectors for the lower-rank habilitation. 
Under the most restrictive scenario the minimal incidence of discriminated candidates in 
these 10 CSs is 13.5% (09/E4-Electric and electronic measurement systems); the 
maximum is 33.3% (09/B2-Industrial and mechanical plant), for the higher-rank 
habilitations; for the lower-rank habilitations the interval is narrower, from a minimum 
of 10.9% in 01/A1 (Mathematical logic and complementary mathematics) to a 
maximum of 18.8% in 07/H4 (Clinical veterinary and veterinary pharmacology). In the 
other scenarios the incidence of discriminated candidates in the total of non-habilitated 
rises notably: for the higher-rank habilitation, the incidence is never less than 50%, with 
peaks of 80% in 08/A1 (Hydraulics, maritime construction and hydrology) and 09/C1 
(Fluid machines, energy and environmental systems). For the lower-rank habilitation the 
incidence of discriminated candidates under scenarios 2 and 3 is never less than 45%, 
with peaks of 60% (under scenario 2, for 04/A3-Applied geology and once again for 
08/A1). 
The analyses of the individual scenarios indicate that the incidence of cases of 
discrimination is still greater in the habilitation to full professor but similar between the 
two ranks in terms of the CSs involved. The Spearman coefficient of correlation 
between the associate and full professor ranks for the lists of CSs is: 0.630 for scenario 
1; 0.683 for scenario 2; and 0.671 for scenario 3. Observing Table 13, concerning 
scenario 1 we can see that five CSs result as present in both the lists for the associate 
and the full professor ranks. The comparison between the lists relative to the three 
scenarios for the 109 sectors analyzed indicates an almost perfect correlation between 
the second and third scenarios (Spearman  = 0.973 for the habilitation to full professor 
and 0.929 for the associates).The correlation between the lists concerning scenarios 1 
and 2 is lower but equally significant (Spearman  0.591 for full professor habilitation 
and 0.679 for associate), as also holds for scenarios 1 and 3 ( = 0.662 for full professor 
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and  = 0.713 for associate). 
 
Table 13: List of the first 10 CSs for incidence of cases of probable discrimination on the total of non-
habilitated (%), in the three scenarios analyzed 
Habilitation to full professor  Habilitation to associate professor 
Scenario 1 
 
Scenario 2  Scenario 3  Scenario 1  Scenario 2 
 
Scenario 3 
09/B2 33,3 
 
08/A1 80.5  09/C1 80,0  07/H4 18,8  04/A3 60.6 
 
01/A4 59,3 
07/H2 18,2 
 
09/C1 80.0  01/A4 61,0  09/C1 13,6  08/A1 60.0 
 
11/E4 55,6 
01/A1 17,4 
 
09/A3 68.6  09/B1 60,0  01/A4 13,6  09/D1 59.8 
 
04/A3 55,3 
08/A4 16,0 
 
09/D1 66.9  09/D1 58,8  08/A4 13,0  01/A4 59.3 
 
09/D1 54,6 
01/A6 15,8 
 
08/B2 62.5  09/A3 57,1  09/E4 12,5  11/E2 56.9 
 
09/B1 53,3 
09/B3 15,8 
 
04/A2 62.3  02/B3 57,1  09/A2 11,9  11/E4 55.6 
 
11/E2 50,7 
07/F1 14,8 
 
09/E4 62.2  06/F4 54,6  02/B3 11,2  09/B1 53.3 
 
06/F4 50,6 
01/A4 14,6 
 
04/A3 61.4  02/A1 54,2  07/F1 11,1  06/F4 52.6 
 
02/B3 45,8 
06/E3 13,9 
 
05/A2 61.1  09/E4 54,1  01/A3 10,9  09/E4 46.9 
 
09/C1 45,5 
09/E4 13,5 
 
01/A4 61.0  08/A1 53,7  01/A1 10,9  07/B2 46.3 
 
09/E4 45,3 
 
 
5.2 Analysis of cases of favoritism 
 
Table 14 summarizes the analysis concerning cases of favoritism. Under the 
definition of the most restrictive scenario (scenario 1), the favored candidates are 
slightly more than 1% of the total habilitated to full professor, and 0.6% of those 
habilitated to associate. As a matter of fact the scenario seems extremely conservative: 
the percentage of those favored exceeds 10% of the habilitated in only two of the CSs 
for full professor competitions, and in no CSs for the associate habilitation. 
The incidence of those favored rises notably in the other scenarios. In scenario 2 the 
percentage of favored candidates is 30.7% for the competitions to higher rank and 
32.3% for the lower. The third scenario again shows an incidence of favored candidates 
that is greater for the associate rank (29.4%) than for full professor (27.8%). The 
number of CSs with a percentage of favored candidates greater than 30% of the 
habilitated ranges from a minimum of 38 (of 109 total), for the higher rank under 
scenario 3, to a maximum of 59 for the lower rank under scenario 2. 
 
Table 14: Probable cases of favored candidates under the three scenarios analyzed 
Habilitation to Full professor Associate professor 
Total candidates 11,427 24,429 
Habilitated 5,099 10,901 
Favored (% of total habilitated): scenario 1 1.1% 0,6% 
Favored (% of total habilitated): scenario 2 30,7% 32,3% 
Favored (% of total habilitated): scenario 3 27,8% 29,4% 
No. sectors with % favored > 10%: scenario 1 2 (of 109) 0 (of 109) 
No. sectors with % favored > 30%: scenario 2 50 (of 109) 59 (of 109) 
No. sectors with % favored > 30%: scenario 3 38 (of 109) 51 (of 109) 
 
This aggregate analysis thus reveals a rate of favoritism that is generally lower than 
the rate of discrimination, and unlike the preceding analysis, greater for the competition 
to associate than to full professor rank. 
The sectors with a higher rate of favoritism are listed in Table 15. Under scenario 1, 
concerning the habilitation to full professor, the maximum incidence of favored 
candidates is traced to 09/B2-Industrial and mechanical plant (14.3%), followed by 
09/C1-Fluid machines, energy and environmental systems (11.4%). In the list of the 
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first 10 we find two more CSs (09/G1-Automatics and 09/A3-Design and methods for 
industrial engineering, metallurgy) of UDA 09 (Industrial and information engineering). 
Under the other scenarios, still concerning habilitation to full professor, the CSs that 
appear most frequently are those that belong to UDA 6 (Medicine), although it is a 
Biology CS that top the lists (05/E2-Molecular Biology), with an incidence of 60.3% for 
scenario 2 and 53.8% for scenario 3. For the habilitation to associate professor, the 
sectors of UDA 9 are again at the top: 09/B1 (Production technologies and systems), 
09/B2 (Industrial and mechanical plant) and 09/C1 (Fluid machines, energy and 
environmental Systems) appear in the lists under all three scenarios, as does also 02/B2 
(Didactics and history of physics). A further three sectors of Industrial and information 
engineering (09/E2-Electrical energy systems, electrical convertors, machines and 
switches, 09/E4-Electric and electronic measurement systems and 09/G1-Automatics), 
appear in the lists for scenarios 2 and 3. At the same time, still for the habilitation to 
associate professor, CSs 01/A1 (Mathematical logic and complementary mathematics), 
01/A6 (Operations research) and 07/F1 (Food sciences) appear in two of the three lists 
for the scenarios. The analysis of correlation between the rankings under the different 
scenarios reveals a strong correlation between scenarios 2 and 3 (Spearman  = 0.963), 
and weak correlation between scenarios 1 and 2 (Spearman  = 0.241) and between 1 
and 3 (Spearman  = 0.269). Correlating the rankings of the 109 sectors for the 
associate and full professor competitions, we see a Spearman  equal to 0.302 for 
scenario 1 and slightly higher for the other two (0.344 for scenario 2 and 0.327 for 
scenario 3), which indicates that in this case there is non-homogeneity in the behavior 
on the part of the committees. 
 
Table 15: List of the first ten CSs for incidence of favored candidates on total habilitated (%), under 
the three scenarios analyzed  
Habilitation to full professor  Habilitation to associate professor 
Scenario 1 
 
Scenario 2  Scenario 3  Scenario 1  Scenario 2 
 
Scenario 3 
09/B2 14.3 05/E2 60.3  05/E2 53.8  09/B2 7.3  09/G1 68.4 09/G1 64.9 
09/C1 11.4  06/A1 58.6  06/A1 51.7  09/B1 5.3  09/E4 60.0  09/E4 56.7 
06/F3 7.3  07/E1 52.8  06/D4 48.8  09/C1 5.1  09/B2 58.5  09/B2 53.7 
09/G1 6.8  06/D2 50.0  06/E3 47.8  02/A2 3.6  02/B2 57.9  07/F1 53.6 
01/A5 6.3  06/D4 49.6  11/E2 47.1  01/A1 3.5  07/F1 53.6  09/B1 52.6 
04/A4 5.9  06/E3 47.8  09/B3 46.7  02/B2 3.3  09/B1 52.6  01/A6 52.2 
06/A3 5.6  11/E2 47.1  06/D2 44.6  02/A1 3.2  09/C1 52.5  09/C1 50.8 
01/A4 4.8  09/B3 46.7  07/E1 44.4  07/H1 3.2  01/A6 52.2  02/B2 50.7 
02/A1 4.7  03/B2 46.4  11/E1 42.6  02/B3 3.1  09/E2 52.2  01/A1 49.1 
09/A3 4.4  05/F1 46.2  03/D1 40.6  06/A2 2.9  09/A3 49.5  09/E2 47.8 
 
 
6. Discussion and conclusions 
 
The publication of the results from the first Italian call for scientific habilitation to 
associate and full professor provides the elements for a first evaluation of the effects of 
the most recent of a long series of reforms attempted in this country, in the hopes of 
contrasting favoritism and discrimination in academic recruitment. 
The analyses conducted reveal very clearly that for candidates already on staff as 
assistant or associate professor, and aspiring to career progression, it is sufficient to 
have a lower scientific performance than that of the candidates external to the academia, 
in order to have the same probability of success. For the incumbents, the same can be 
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said of the candidates classified in the sector (CS) of the competition, compared to those 
from other CSs; and again, in the habilitation to full professor, for the associate 
professors compared to the assistant professors. The deeper investigation of the 
incidence of possible cases of discrimination and favoritism, shows that the first appears 
more extensive than the second, and certainly so for the habilitation to full professor. 
The stratification of the data by UDA shows significant differences: in Mathematics, the 
bibliometric performance seems to have had relatively scarce weight on the results of 
the habilitation, certainly for the competitions to full professor. On the opposite front, in 
the Chemistry sectors the results seem to converge with those predictable on the basis of 
a purely bibliometric evaluation. The Industrial and information engineering UDA has 
the highest concentration of CSs with greater incidence of possible cases of 
discrimination and favoritism. The phenomenon of favoritism also seems to have 
affected various CSs of Medicine. 
The results of the analyses could give credit to two interpretations: the first is that 
the model of analysis based on bibliometric indicators, being unable to embed all the 
dimensions for evaluation of scientific merit, would have a systematic bias of evaluation 
in favor of candidates external to the academia or the CS, or of lower academic rank. 
Such an interpretation would be in spite of good sense, which would lead one to hold 
that there is a strong correlation between research performance and other dimensions of 
scientific merit (capacity to attract funds, positions on editorial boards of international 
journals, management of R&D, activities in technology transfer, etc.). 
The other possible interpretation is that the cases detected denote actual phenomena 
of discrimination and favoritism, as confirmed by the high numbers of legal claims 
accepted by the Administrative Courts, and in line with the findings from other studies 
on Italian university competitions (see Section 1). This second interpretation aligns with 
a diffuse vision that the Italian university system is a “closed shop”, with barriers to 
entry from outside that become higher with increasing academic rank. Within the closed 
shop there would then be the many smaller closed shops of the CSs, which defend the 
tradition and purity of the field; but especially of the consolidated social networks, 
which present formidable obstacles to the entry of “external” candidates, even when 
these are themselves Italian professors. Finally, this would be a closed shop managed by 
means of profound, almost military hierarchies, where rank and seniority in rank carry 
significant weight in whatever decisions, and career progression is often merited 
because of respect for the social rules that the hierarchy imposes. 
However, recognizing the limits of bibliometrics as instrument of research 
evaluation, and adopting the cautions that scientific argument imposes, we assume that 
the truth probably lies somewhere between the two interpretations. That is, we accept 
that in some cases the judgment of the committees served to correct erroneous results 
that would have otherwise arisen from purely bibliometric evaluation, while in others it 
served to favor one candidate or discriminate against others. 
The analysis presented here also highlights that the habilitation procedure attracted a 
quantity of aspiring faculty on the same order of size as the current national university 
research staff. With the current restrictions on turnover, expected to last at least over the 
near future, the universities can only announce calls for a very low share of the posts 
that would be necessary to absorb all the habilitated candidates, and this will now 
certainly become a further source of significant tension surrounding the system, 
considering the impossibility of satisfying the career expectation of such a massive 
number of scientists. In addition there is the entropy imposed on the system by the 
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enormous number of decisions pending while the administrative courts work through 
the claims from candidates who were refused habilitation, and who now appeal the work 
of the committees that judged them. After a second call for habilitations, in which the 
total applications were only a third of those for the first call, the government has 
suspended the entire procedure, while announcing the preparation of the latest round of 
reforms. The unofficial expectation is that certain elements of the current procedure will 
be changed, while the overall structure remains. 
In light of the analyses conducted, we would suggest that in the upcoming 
competitions for habilitation, the requisites of merit for eligibility to membership in the 
committees be made more stringently dependent on performance, given that it is 
legitimate to hold that the inclination to discrimination and favoritism is less diffuse 
among top performers. Furthermore, we suggest that the composition of the committees 
be extended to scientists from outside the university sphere, at equal level to the full 
professors, specifically inviting the “research directors” of public research institutions. 
These would presumably have less vested interests in the university system and so be 
less inclined to support exchanges of favors. From the analysis of the minutes regarding 
candidates that were not habilitated in spite of a top-10% bibliometric score, the 
motivation by far most frequently cited for the refusal is the incomplete fit of the 
candidate with the competition sector. The increasing multi-disciplinary character of 
research, and the blurred boundaries of research fields contrast with the assumption of 
competition sectors as sealed chambers. This makes it insupportable that such a high 
number of top scientists would be judged “unsuitable” for such a motivation. For such 
cases of top-scientist refusals it should be made compulsory that the committees 
indicate the alternative sector for the candidate, which they observe as being better 
suited. In the case of habilitated candidates with scarce scientific performance, and of 
non-habilitated with high performance, the committees should also be requested to 
provide precise and public reasoning of their decisions. In fact for many of the 
committees, the minutes presented were reduced to the mere provision of the same text 
of reasoning for every candidate, with the substitution of several customizing adjectives 
in the decision. Finally, the autonomy awarded to the committees in defining the 
evaluation parameters and criteria should be flanked by a true assumption of 
responsibility (delegation and consequences), to disincentivize immoral comportments 
that cannot be tolerated in civil nations, let alone in public institutions devoted to higher 
education and the shaping of society itself. 
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